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EGISLATION is being considered which would
allow depository financial institutions throughout the
nation to offer to households interest-paying checking
accounts, more popularly known as NOW (Negotiable
Order of Withdrawal) accounts. Bankers, in general,
are concerned about the effects on earnings of such a
regulatory change. Several studies of NOW accounts,
however, suggest that this concern may be unjustified,
as only small earnings effects have been detected in
areas where NOW accounts are currently permitted?
One of the reasons for the expectation of small
effects on bank earnings due to nationwide NOW
accounts can he traced to the ways by which banks
are currently circumventing the prohibition of interest
on demand deposits by offering services to depositors
at no charge or at low rates. The primary service
offered to households is the processing of checks writ-
ten and deposited by these customers. In effect, this
amounts to implicit interest payments.2 Thus, permis-
sion for nationwide NOW accounts would have the
most pronounced effect on the form in which banks
pay demand deposit interest, with direct interest
payments replacing indirect, or implicit, interest
payments.
mThose studies also suggest that future earnings effects of
NOW accounts are likely to be rednced as more banks re-
quire minimoum balances and/or charge for previously free
services. See Ralph C. Kimball, “Recent Developments in
The NOW Account Experiment in New England,” New
England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
(November/December 1976), pp. 3-19; Kimball, “Impacts of
NOW .kccounts and Thrift Institution Competition on Se-
lected SmnaIl Commercial Banks in Massachusetts antI New
hampshire, 1974-75,” New England Economic Review
(January/February 1977), pp. 22-38; and john D. Paulus,
“Effects of ‘NOW’ Accounts on Costs and Earnings of Com-
mercial Banks in 1974—75,” Staff Economic Studies, Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1976.
2David C. Cates and Samnm,el B. Chase, Jr., Time Payment of
Interest on Checking Accountt.s, a report to the South Caro-
lina Bankers Association, Fehruam’y 1976; Charles F. flay—
wood, “Possible Effects of Payment of Imsterest on Dcmnanrl
Deposits,” in Studies on the Payment of Interest on Checking
Accounts (Washington, D.C. ‘. Anmerican Bankers Association,
1976), pp. 1—11; Charles lloffmnam, and Earlene Herman,
This article is concerned with the same sort of
analysis of interest-hearing demand deposits, only as
it applies to business accounts.1 Although business
accounts have not been given serious consideration in
the discussion of permitting interest-bearing demand
deposits, it seems likely that a favorable experience
with interest-bearing household accounts could lead to
the lifting of the interest-paying prohibition on all
demand deposits.~The analysis involves an examina-
tion of compensating balances, or the demand deposit
balances banks require from firms in compensation for
preferential loan terms or low-priced services.
THE ROLE OF COMPENSATING
BALANCE REQUIREMENTS IN THE
COMPETITION AMONG BANKS FOR
THE DEPOSITS OF BUSINESS FIRMS
Bank policies of requiring compensating balances
from business finns are considered since, as revealed
NOW .Accounts in New England,” Studies on the Payment
of interest on Checking Accounts, pp. 23—38; William A.
Longbrake, “Comninercial Bank Capacity to Pay Interest on
Demand Deposits, Part 11; Earnings and Cost Analysis,”
Journal of Bank Research (Summner 1976), pp. 134-49;
Carl C. Nielsen, Bottom Line Study for Kansas Banks, pre-
pared for the Kansas Bankers Association, May 1977; Staff
Study, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
The Impact of the Paymne;mt of Interest on Demand Deposits,
January 31, 1977.
~ recent regmmlatory change has mnade the prohibition of
interest payments on the demnand deposits of business firms
less effective. Banks am’e now pennitted to offer savings ac—
cosmnts to btmsincss firms up to $150,000 per firmn. The firms
that take advarmtage of another regtmlatomy change which
allows l,anks to transfer funds between their checking and
savings accounts based upon telephone instruction are able to
keep part of their working balances in interest earning
acc’ommnts. However, these changes in regulations significantly
affect the cash management of only relatively small firms.
Tsvi, recent studies consider vemy briefly the effects on banks
of imiterest on demnand deposits of business firmns. Both studies
conclmmde that smmch interest payments Wum mId have minimal
effects on bank earnings. See Cates and Chase, The Payment
of Interest on Checking Accounts, p. viii, and Staff Study,
Board of Governors, The Impact of the Payment of Interest
on Demand Deposits, pp. 44-45.
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in several studies cited below, most bank lending
arrangements with business firms involve compensat-
ing balance requiremnents. Therefore, if banks are cur-
rently paying implicit interest on demand deposit
balances of business firms, such hank policies would
tend to be reflected in the nature of compensating
balance requirements.
Differing views are held as to why banks require
compensating balances. One viexv is that banks re-
quire compensating balances simply to increase the
return on loans. Another view is that compensating
balances serve as partial collateral for loans,
Of these two explanations, the argument that banks
attempt to increase their returns on loans by requiring
hom’rowers to hold demand balances is discussed more
frequently in the banking literature.5 According to
this view, a hank requires a borrower to leave some
proportion of its loan with the hank as an idle demand
deposit balance. Under this arrangement the effective
yield on lending to the customer is higher than the
stated rate on its loan, since the customer has use of
only a portion of the total loan on which it is paying
interest. While only a few economists explicitly state
this view of compensating balances, many apparently
support it when they claim that the true costs of bor-
rowing at commercial banks must he adjusted upward
from stated loan rates to reflect the additional cost of
holding idle compensating balances.
The accuracy of this explanation of compensating
balances can he tested, since it Imas several implica-
tions for behavior. For example, the stated interest
rates on loans to horrowem’s that hold compensating
balances would tend to be lower than the interest
rates on loans to borrowers that do not hold compen-
sating balances. Also, banks would set compensating
balance requirements in termns of minimum balances,
since compensating balances would represent simply
the borrowed funds which customers are not allowed
to use, and not their working balances. Consequently,
demand deposit balances of borrowers holding com-
pensating balances would tend to be at least some
minimum fraction of their outstanding loans at all
points in time. These inferences would also follow
from the explanation that compensating balances
serve as a form of partial collateral for loans.
5
For a discussion of this explanatiomi of compemmsating bal-
ances, see the following articles by Paul S. Nadier: “Com-
pensating Balamices amid the Prime at Twilight,” Harvard
Business Reciew ( janmman’—Februarv 1972), pp. 112—20; amid
“A Doubtful Device Even Before Lance,” New York Times,
Septemnher 25, 1977, p. P16.
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A third view of compensating balances is that banks
require them as part of agreenients that involve pay-
ment of implicit interest on the demand deposits that
business firms use as their working balances. Business
finns hold working balances to finance their transac-
tions,hut banks are not allowed to compete for those
deposits with offers of direct interest payments. Oper-
ating under this constraint on bank competition, firms
shopto find banks which, in return for deposit of their
working balances, will offer loans at lowest interest
rates and lowest fees for services. To insure that the)’
are compensated for preferential loan tenus and low
fees on services, banks require that firms keep certain
average demand deposit balances. Thus, finns can use
their deposits that sen-c as compensating balances for
their working balances, drawing them down when
making expenditures and letting them accumulate
when receiving payments.
If this third intem-pretation of compensating bal-
ance requirements is correct, banks xvould tend to
offer better loan terms and lower fees on services to
their depositors than to nondepositors, but also, banks
would set compensating balance requirements in
terms of average balances, rather than minim urn.
Therefore, at any point in time, demand deposit bal-
ances of customers holding comnpcnsating balances
would not necessardç, be some minimumn proportion
of their loans outstanding.
Several reasons can lie given for accepting the view
that compensating balance requirements reflect pay-
ment of implicit interest on the working balances of
business finns, and thus, for rejecting the view that
banks require compensating balances just to raise the
effective interest rates on loans. If banks require firms
to hold idle compensatisig balances to increase their
effective yields on loans. both banks and their custo-
misers could benefit from elimninating such comnpensat-
ing balance requirements, except when usury ceilings
are effective. The same reasoning can be used to
indicate why reqsmiring mninimnm compensating bal-
ances wouldl be an unprofitable way of charging for
use of bank services or of requiring borrowers to pro-
vidle collateral for loans. However, as indicated in the
Appendix, both banks and their borrowers can benefit
from average conipensating balance requirements
satisfied by the customers’ workmg balances.
Also, evidence on banking practices presented in
the following section indicates that most banks allow
their business customers to meet compensating bal-
ance reqtsirernents with average balances. instead of
setting minimnusn balance requirements. This result
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supports the view that banks are paying implicit
interest on the working balances of business firms.
Finally, compensating balances are most frequently
imposed upon relatively large firms by large banks, as
noted in several surveys of banking practices. The
market for loans to the relatively large firms is gener-
ally believed to he the most competitive market for
bank loans. Therefore, these observations are con-
sistent only if compensating balance requirements re-
flect competition by banks for demand deposits.
A SURVEY OF EVIDENCE
Two conditions are necessary if compensating bal-
ance requirements are to be interpreted as part of
arrangements by which banks pay implicit interest on
the demand deposits that their business borrowers use
as working balances:
(a) Depositors receive better loan terms than non-
depositors with similar risk characteristics or re-
ceive services at lower fees than nondepositors.
(b) Banks allow firms to meet compensating balance
requirements with their average balances.
Loan Terms and Fees an Services for
Depositors
Several studies present evidence that business firms
do receive preferential loan terms when they borrow
where they hold demand deposit accounts!’ A recent
study of reports by corporations to the Securities and
Exchange Commission provides additional evidence of
preferential loan terms for depositors. In reports from
a sample of corporations, about half of the firms bor-
rowing at banks under compensating balance reqtnre-
ments reported that banks offered options of borrow-
ing at higher interest rates without compensating
balance requirements, even though such information
was not requested in the reports.7
Evidence that firms receive implicit interest on
their demand deposit balances in the form of services
is available from studies of account analysis by banks.
A bank conducting account analysis keeps records on
services used by a business customer, calculates the
average level of demand deposits irs the customer’s
account that are necessary to compensate the bank
for services used, and analyzes the customei’s demand
deposit balance to determine whether it is generally
large enough to compensate the hank for the services
used without charging explicit fees. A study of ac-
count analysis at 130 major U.S. banks conducted by
the Kansas City Federal Reserve Bank in July 1976
lists balance requirements for 31 separate corporate
services!’
Indirect evidence that banks have been paying im-
plicit interest on demand deposits is found in a study
by Klein.9 He estimated an implicit rate of return
that banks would have been paying on demand de-
posits under the assumption that banks are competi-
tive. Equations which estimate the aggregate demand
for money were improved significantly by including
this estimated rate of return on demand deposits as an
explanatory variable. Klein’s study indicates that, in
adjusting cash holdings to changes in interest rates,
the public behaves as though banks are paying inter-
est on demand deposits. His evidence does not apply
specifically to the demand for money by business
firms, but since a large proportion of money holdings
are by business firms, conclusions concerning deter-
minants of the total demand for money would tend to
hold for the money holdings of business firms.10
Compensating Balances a-s Working Balances
Surveys of Banking Practices — Several studies of
how banks calculate and enforce compensating bal-
ance requirements were conducted in the 1950s and
1960s. based on interviesvs with bankers or question-
naires filled out by bankers, Those studies indicated
that compensating balance requirements were com- 1mDminald P. Jacobs, Business Loan Costs amid Bank Market
Structure. An Empirical Estimate of Their Relations, Na-
tional Bureau of Econonuc Research, Occasional Paper 115
(New York: Colimmbia University Press, 1971); Neil Murphy,
A Study of Wholesale Banking Behavior (Federal Reserve
Bank of Boston, 1969), pp. 60-67; James Cooper, “The De-
mand for Bank Outputs and the Bank-Customer Relation-
ship,” Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois, 1967,
pp. 105-22; and Donald Hester, “An Empirical Examination
of a Comsmnmercial Bank Loan Offer Fimnction,” Stydies in
Portfolio Behavior (New York: John Wiley and Sons, hue.,
1967), p. 165.
7
The study is based upon financial statemnents of 100 corpora-
tions for 1975. About 60 percent of these firms reported bor-
rowing nuder compensatimsg balance requmirements. Of the
other finns, about half had an short-term domestic bank
borrowings. See Richard Kolodny and Peter Seeley, “The
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Imstegratiomi of Compensating Balance Theory and Monetary
Theory,” State University of New York at Binghamntou,
mimeographed, May 1976.
5
For a discussion of mimethodologv in the account analysis
stimdy, see Robert E. Knight, “Account Analysis in Corre-
spondent Bammking,” Monthly Review, Federal Reserve Bank
of Kansas City (March 1976), pp. 11-20.
0
Benjamin Klein, “Competitive Interest Payments on Bank
Deposits and the Long-Run Demnand for Money,” American
Economic Review (December 1974), pp. 931-49.
~‘~Th1976, hmmsiness firms ‘vere estimnated to hold about 60 per-
cent of the demand deposits of individuals, partmierships,
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mon in bank lending agreements with business firms,
especially among large banks lending to large firms.”
The bases on which compensating balance require-
ments are determined vary among banks, as propor-
tions of actual borrowings, credit lines, or both.
Whatever the amount of compensating balances, the
surveys revealed that banks generally allowed firms
to meet these requirements with average annual bal-
ances. The primary exception was arrangements with
finance companies, which were ofteu required to hold
minimum compensating balances.’2
A survey of compensating balance practices con-
ducted by Bums in 1971 yields results which are very
similar to those of the older studies cited above.’3
His survey included 109 banks in the Eleventh Fed-
eral Reserve District. All banks in the survey with
total deposits over $500 million required compensat-
ing balances of borrowers, whereas less than half of
the banks with total deposits under $50 million did so.
All of the banks with total deposits over $100 million
allowed finns to meet compensating balance require-
“Nevins D. Baxter and Harold T. Shapiro, “Compensating-
Balance Requirements: The Results of a Survey,” Journal
of Finance (Septemnber 1964), pp. 483-96; Caroline H.
Cagle, “Credit Lines aad Minimum Balance Requirements,”
Federal Reserve Bulletin (June 1956), pp. 573-79; F. P.
Gallot, “Why Compensating Balances? Part II,” Bulletin of
the Robert Morris Associates (August 1958), pp. 309-19;
William E. Gibson, “Compensating Balance Requirements,”
National Banking Review (March 1965), pp. 387-95;
Douglas A. Hayes, Bank Lending Policies: Issues and
Practices (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Bmmreau of Business Re-
search, University of Michigan, 1964); Donald Hodgman,
Commercial Bank Loan and Investment Policy (Champaign,
Illinois: B,mreass of Economnic and Business Research, Uni-
versity of Illinois, 1963), pp. 24-26; Thomas Mayer and
Ira 0. Scott, Jr., “Compensating Balances: A Suggested
Interpretation,” National Banking Review (Decemnber
1963), pp. 157-66.
12
By experience, banks can anticipate that, given the demand
by firms in most industries for short—termn credit and trans-
actions balances, their average demnand deposit balances
will he large enough, in relation to their average borrowings,
to snake the combined hmmsiness with those finns profitable,
even when lending to them at preferential rates. The de-
mand for short-term credit relative to transactions demand
for money is higher for finance companies than for finns in
many other industries. If banks allowed finns in financial
industries to use their demand deposits as working balances
with iso mninimnum deposits required, they commld not amstici—
pate profitable business with such flrmns if their loans were
at the preferential rates given other depositors. Therefore,
financial firms that prefer the prestige of being prime bor-
ro~vershold demand deposit balances at the lending banks
and accept minimum deposit balance restrictions. See Jack
M. Cuttentag and Richard C. Davis, “Compensating Bal-
ances,” Monthly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New
York (December 1961), pp. 205-10; Davis and Cuttentag,
“Are Compensating Balance Requirements Irrational?,”
Journal of Finance (March 1962), pp. 121-26.
i
7
Joseph E. Burns, “Compensating Balance Requirements
Integral to Bank Lending,” Business Review, Federal Re-
serve Bank of Dallam (February 1972), pp. 1-8.
ments by using average deposit balances, whereas
about 20 percent of the smaller banks that use com-
pensating balance requirements required minimum
balances.
Studies of the Demand for Money by Firma — Two
recent studies examine the nature of compensating
balance requirements by estimating the influence of
the level of bank loans by individual firms on their
demand for money balances.’4 Both studies use data
from quarterly reports made by firms to the Securities
and Exchange Commission. The money balances re-
ported by firms (as of four days each year at quarterly
intervals) are estimated as a function of sales or pro-
duction, short-term interest rates (as measures of the
opportunity cost of holding money), holdings of liquid
assets, and the level of bank loans outstanding. The
quarterly observations are for individual firms.
Bank debt is included as an independent variable
to test the influence of compensating balance require-
ments on money holdings of firms. If banks impose
minimum compensating balance requirements on
firms, there would tend to be a positive relation
among firms between their loans from banks and their
demand deposits at any point in time. However, if
compensating balance requirements were not en-
forced, or if they were enforced as average balance
requirements, there would be no basis for expecting
a positive relation between the deposit balances and
bank loans outstanding. Instead, demand deposit bal-
ances would fluctuate from day to day, and bank loans
outstanding would also be variable for many of the
firms in the study.
The influence of bank loans on the money holdings
of firms was found to be either negative or insignifi-
cant, while other variables were found to have the
expected influences. These results are inconsistent
with the view that banks impose minimum compen-
sating balance requirements on firms.
Additional Evi.dence on Compensating Balances —
A survey of business loans at banks in the St. Louis
area was conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis in the spring of 1968.’~ That survey includes
information on total loans outstanding by individual
t
’Tini Canmpbell and Leland Brondsel, “The Impact of Com-
pensating Balance Requirements on the Cash Balances of
Manufacturing Corpom’ations: An Emnpirical Study,” Journal
of Finance (March 1977), pp. 31-40; C. Robert Coates,
The Demand for Money by Finns (New York: Marcel
Dekker, Inc., 1976), pp. 148-54.
~~Detailed results from this study are available from the
ammthor ,mpon request.
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borrowers, their average demand deposit balance dur-
ing the month of the survey if they had a demand
deposit account where they borrowed, activity in
those demand deposit accounts, and the industrial
classification of borrowers.
Data from this survey can be used to analyze the
nature of compensating balance requirements. One
approach is to examine the distribution of the ratios
of demand deposit balances to loans outstanding
among individual borrowers that have demand de-
posit accounts where they borrow. Data from the
survey provide approximations to the demand deposit
balances and loans outstanding of borrowers as of a
point in time, since the measure of demand deposit
balances is average balances over a month, and loans
outstanding are reported as of the end of that month.
if banks impose minimum compensating balance
requirements, the observed deposit-to-loan ratios of
individual customers at any point in time would be at
or above the required compensating balance ratios.
Firms observed to have ratios of demand deposits to
loans outstanding higher than the required compen-
sating balance ratios would be those that had just
received large cash inflows at the time of the survey
and those that generally hold higher deposit balances
in relation to. their loans outstanding than banks re-
quire. However, if compensating balance require-
ments are enforced in terms of average balances, the
deposit-to-loan ratios of individual borrowers at a
point in time would be distributed widely above and
below the average compensating balance ratios that
are required.
In this study deposit-to-loan ratios were found to be
distributed widely above and below the ratios men-
tioned in the banking literature as required compen-
sating balance ratios. For instance, at most banks in
the survey, over half of the customers with demand
deposit accounts where they borrowed held demand
deposit balances which were less than ten percent of
their loans outstanding. One exception to this involves
firms in financial industries. Their deposit-to-loan
ratios tended to be more concentrated in the range
from 10 percent to 30 percent than for other borrow-
ers, supporting the view expressed above that mini-
mum compensating balance requirements are enforced
more frequently on financial firms than on firms in
other industries,
Another approach to investigating the nature of
compensating balances involves analyzing the “idle”
demand deposit balances held by business firms. If
Page 12
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compensating balances just represent part of bank
loans that borrowers are required to hold as demand
deposit balancesin somue fixedproportion to the amount
of their loans, borrowers would not have incentives to
hold their working deposit accounts where they bor-
row. Under such conditions demand deposit accounts
of business firms that borrow at banks where they do
not keep their working balances would be “idle,” that
is, have no debits or credits. On the other hand, the
demand deposit accounts of business borrowers would
tend to be active accounts, that is, have frequent
debits and credits, if compensating balances are gener-
ally the working balances of firms.
Survey results indicate that for banks of various
sizes, idle demand deposit balances of their business
borrowers are one percent or less of their total de-
mand deposit liabilities. Also, of the idle demand
deposit balances held by firms, a substantial propor-
tion was held by firms in financial industries. Thus,
almost all of the demand deposit balances held by
business firms at banks where they borrow appear to
be working balances.
IMPLICATIONS OF INTEREST
PAYMENTS ON DEMAND DEPOSITS
FOR BANKS AND THEIR BUSINESS
CUSTOMERS
Would Banks Pay Explicit Interest on
Demand Deposits?
The evidence presented above indicates that banks
are paying implicit interest on the working balances
of business firms. Given that banks and their business
customers have found means of circumventing the
prohibition of interest on demand deposits, would
banks be induced to pay explicit interest on demand
deposits if given permission to do so, or would banks
and their customers be satisfied with current arrange-
ments for compensating depositors? Implications of
interest on demand deposits for banks and their
business customers developed in the following sec-
tions are based upon the assumption that banks would
pay explicit interest on demand deposits of business
firms if given permission to do so.
One set of circumstances under which banks would
tend to offer explicit interest would be if, under the
prohibition on interest payments, banks had been
offering their depositors different implicit interest
rates. Banks could do so if they could take advantage
of varying degrees of information that customers haveFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS NOVEMBER 1977
about banking services that are available in return for
their deposit accounts. The prohibition of interest pay-
ments is conducive to such discrimination. Banks may
be able to offer business customers different combina-
tions of credit terms and services without variation in
implicit returns becoming common knowledge among
hank customers, because of the individualized nature
of such packages of credit terms and services.
However, if banks began offering explicit interest
on demand deposits and pricing services separately,
customers could more easily make comparisons among
banks, and therefore, opportunities for discrimination
among customers would be reduced. Banks especially
interested in expanding the scope of their operations
might begin offering explicit interest on deposits to
attract customers that had been receiving relatively
small implicit returns on. their deposit balances at
other banks. Those banks attempting to attract more
deposits would be able to communicate information
to potential customers concerning explicit interest to
be paid on demand deposits more easily than infor-
mation on the availability of various combinations of
loan terms and bank services. Under such conditions
there would be competitive pressures on other banks
to offer explicit interest on demand deposits.
The case for assuming that banks would pay ex-
plicit interest on demand deposits does not depend,
however, upon bank discrimination among customers.
Even if banks are currently paying competitive im-
plicit rates of interest on the demand deposit balances
of all firms, there would also be reasons to expect that
banks would begin paying explicit interest if given
permission to do so.
If banks set no floor on loan rates to depositors,
firms could receive all of their implicit interest on
demand deposits in the form of bank loans at rela-
tively low interest rates. Firms xvith small loan de-
mand relative to their average demand deposit bal-
ances would be allowed to borrow at relatively low
interest rates in order to provide the same implicit
return as that to depositors with relatively larger loan
demands.
However, banks generally set the prime rate as the
minimum loan rate for all borrowers, including deposi-
tors, and surveys indicate that required compensating
balance ratios generally vary- between 10 percent and
20 percent. Therefore, the benefit a firm receives from
its bank in terms of preferential loan terms is limited
by its demand for bank loans at the prime rate. Cus-
tomers which have low loan demands relative to their
average demand deposit balances would receive any
additional implicit interest in the form of services at
no cost or at fees lower than costs to banks of provid-
ing the services. Given this pricing structure, the
marginal units of bank services would be of little
value to many firms, and thus they would not receive
the full value of their implicit interest. Such firms
would benefit from receiving their interest on deposits
directly as cash payments and purchasing bank serv-
ices at fees high enough to cover costs (including
normal returns). With explicit fees a firm would de-
mand bank services only up to the point at which the
value to the finn from an additional unit of service
equals the cost to the bank of providing the service.
The history of hank competition for demand de-
posits prior to the 1930s can perhaps provide some
guidance on whether banks would pay explicit inter-
est on demand deposits. Major money center banks
frequently agreed to limit rates of interest on demand
deposits, hut often those agreements were under-
mined quickly by competitive behavior.16 If banks
failed at limiting rate competition on demand de-
posits prior to the 1930s, when anti-trust prosecution
of such collusive agreements was more lax, they prob-
ably would not be able to limit interest rate competi-
tion for demand deposits now, unless government sets
the rate.
Effects on Bank Profits
The eflects that explicit interest payments on de-
mand deposits of business firms would have on earn-
ings depends upon the implicit interest rates they
have been paying. With limited information publicly
available on individual hank-customer relationships,
it is difficult to estimate the implicit interest rates
banks are now paying. For banks now paying a com-
petitive implicit interest rate, interest on deposits
would have minimal eflects on earnings. The staff of
the Board of Governors made a rough estimate that
explicit interest payments on demand deposits would
increase the net costs of business demand deposits to
banks by no more than one-half of one percent.17
Effects on Bank Loan Interest Rates
The analysis above has implications for another
issue involved in the payment of interest on demand
deposits: would banks raise their interest rates on
i6Albcrt H. Cox, Jr., Regulation of Interest on Bank Deposits
(Ann Arbor, Michigan: Bureau of Business Research, Uni-
versity of Michigan, 1966), pp. 1-11.
17”The lmnpact of the Payment of Interest on Demand
Deposits,” pp. 44-45.
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loans to offset part of their increase in interest costs,
if the prohibition of interest payments on demand
deposits was lifted, and if they did so, what would be
the reason? One condition under which banks might
raisetheir loan rates in responseto interest on demand
deposits would be if banks have some monopoly power
in the market for credit. If interest on demand de-
posits would raise the marginal costs of lending for
banks, they would tend to raise their interest rates on
loans, although not necessarily by enough to fully
cover the increased cost of attracting funds.
A second possibility is that banks would invest
more of their assets in higher risk, higher rate loans in
order to cover the increased costs of interest payments
on demand deposits. Concern that interest on demand
deposits would induce banks to make high risk loans
has been one of the reasons for prohibiting such inter-
est payments since the early 1930s~8
However, there is a third condition under which
banks would raise interest rates on some of their loans
which would reflect neither monopoly power nor in-
creased risk. If banks are currently paying implicit
interest to business firms on their demand deposit
balances in the form of lower loan rates than those
offered other borrowers, banks would tend to raise the
loan rates offered to their business depositors relative
to the loan rates offered to other borrowers when they
18
Studies by Benston and Cox found that evidence from the
1920s and 1930s does not support the hypothesis that banks
which paid higher interest rates on deposits had more risky
assets Or that banks which paid higher interest rates on
deposits had greater tendency to fail. See George J. Benston,
“interest Payments on Demand Deposits and Bank Invest-
ment Behavior,” Journal of Political Economy (October
1964), pp. 431-49, and Cox, Regulation of Interest on
Bank Deposits.
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began paying explicit interest on demand deposits.
Such a reaction by banks would indicate that they
had been competing indirectly for demand deposits
under the prohibition on explicit interest payments,
and not necessarily that banks have monopoly power
in the market for credit or that banks would be mak-
ing riskier loans.
CONCLUSIONS
Studies of banking practices indicate that firms re-
ceive loans at preferential rates and bank services at
low fees when they borrow or use services at banks
where they keep demand deposit balances. Those
studies also report that the demand deposit balances
which firms hold as compensation for preferential loan
rates or low-priced services are, in general, their work-
ing balances. These observations support the view
that banks have been circumventing the prohibition
of interest payments in competing for the demand
deposit balances of business firms.
If banks were permitted to pay interest on the de-
mand deposit balances of business firms directly, there
would be some incentives for banks to do so. If banks
did begin paying explicit interest, they would tend to
offer depositors and nondepositors the same loan
terms, and end the practice of requiring compensat-
ing balances of business borrowers. Banks that would
substitute explicit for implicit interest payments
would raise the interest rates they charge business
depositors for loans and increase their fees on services.
For banks currently paying competitive interest rates
on the demand deposits of business firms through in-
direct means, payment of explicit interest would have
small net effect on earnings.
APPENDIX
Are Minimum Compensating Balance Requirements Rational?
This appendix demonstrates that both a bank and
borrower could benefit from eliminating minimum com-
pensating balance requirements arid, alternatively, that
both banks and their customers can benefit from compen-
sating balance requirements set in terms of average
balances.
Suppose a bank has excess reserves of $840 which it
plans to lend to its customers. One customer wishes to
borrow $800. If the bank imposes a compensating balance
requirement of 20 percent, it would lend the customer
$1,000 and require that $200 be held in demand bal-
ances. If the bank’s marginal reserve requirement on
demand deposits was 20 percent, its required reserves
would go up by $40 due to creating the $200 of net de-
mand deposits, thus reducing the bank’s excess reserves
to zero. Thus, the hank would use the $840 in excess
reserves by making $800 available to the customer to use
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as it wishes and by creating $200 in compensating bal-
ances, which would increase its required reserves
by $40.
If the bank imposed minimum balance requirements,
the customer would not be allowed to draw its demand
balance below $200. Those balances would not be useful
to the customer for conducting transactions, and there-
fore, the customer would receive no benefit from holding
them. Suppose the bank charges the customer 8 percent
interest on the $1,000. To the borrower this is an effective
interest rate of 10 percent since he pays $80 in interest
annually, on the $1,000 loan, but has use of only $800.
Under these conditions, both the bank and the custo-
mer could benefit from eliminating the compensating
balance requirement. If the bank lent $800 to the cus-
tomer without requiring a demand balance, the bank
would still have $40 in excess reserves to invest, and the
bank and the customer could share interest on the -$40.
The customer would benefit from any reduction in its
interest rate on the $800 loan below 10 percent.
On the other hand, suppose the customer holds a $200
average demand deposit balance and is willing to move
that working balance account to the bank with $840 in
excess reserves if that bank will offer a favorable interest
rate on a loan of $800. Under such an arrangement the
bank would lend $800 to the customer, $40 in reserves
would be required on the $200 addition to the bank’s
demand deposit liabilities, and the bank would, on aver-
age, have $200 in additional excess reserves to invest.
Suppose the market rate of interest on loans to non-
depositors is 10 percent. What rate of interest would the
bank charge the customer with the $200 average demand
deposit balance on its loan of $800? The answer depends
upon the degree of competition among banks. As one
case, suppose banks are perfectly competitive. Under
that assumption, all heuefits from compensating balance
agreements are passed on to depositors. The hank in this
example could increase its earning assets by $160 under
the compensating balance agreement; the customer de-
posits $200, and as an offsetting effect, required reserves
go up by $40. At a market rate of 10 percent, the bank
can earn an additional $16 per year. Under perfect com-
petition, the bank would charge the depositor $64 per
year on the $800 loan, or 8 percent, which is $16 below
what the customer would be charged on the $800 loan as
a nondepositor. With an annual savings of $16 in interest
costs and a $200 average demand deposit balance, the
implicit interest rate on demand deposits is 8 percent.
In this example all benefits from the compensating
balance agreement go to the depositor. However, if the
bank offers the customer a smaller reduction in its loan
interest rate below the market rate, both the bank and
the customer can benefit from a compensating balance
agreement compared to the situation with no compen-
sating balance agreement. For instance, suppose the bank
is willing to lend $800 to the customer with the $200
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average demand deposit balance at $70 interest per year,
instead of $64 as in the example above. The customer
would have paid $80 interest per year as a nondepositor,
and therefore, is better off under this compensating bal-
ance agreement than it would be as a nondepositor. If
the bank did not enter into this compensating balance
agreement, it could earn $84 from lending its $840 of
excess reserves to nondepositors. Howevei~under this
compensating balance agreement, the bank would earn
$70 from lending $800 to the depositor and an additional
$20 per year from investing the depositor’s average de-
mand deposit balance.
This example illustrates how compensating balance
agreements involve implicit interest payments on de-
mand deposits tinder the follosving conditions:
(a) a depositor gets a lower loan rate than it would as
a nondepositor,
(c) the bank attracts additional reserves through the
compensating balance agreement.
Hosvever, compensating balance agreements can involve
implicit interest payments on demand deposits even if a
bank loans a customer the compensating balance, as
illustrated below.
Assume that all conditions are the same as in the
example above except that the bank lends the customer
$200 which is to be held at the bank as a working bal-
ance. The customer also borrows $800 for other purposes,
thus borrowing $1,000 in total. This transaction can be
analyzed like that in the example above by treating the
$1,000 loan as being in two parts: first, the competitive
bank lends the customer $200 for a working demand
deposit balance at the market interest rate of 10 percent,
and then lends $800 at 8 percent, taking into considera-
tion the $200 average compensating balance. The aver-
age interest rate on the tsvo loans would be 8.4 percent,
with interest payments of $84 per year. Since the cus-
tomer would save $16 per year by holding its avenge
demand deposit balance of $200 at the bank at which it
borrows, its implicit interest return on demand deposits
would be 8 percent.
Thus minimum compensating balance requirements
are unprofitable for banks. since by creating demand
deposit balances, which borrowers would hold as idle
balances, banks increase their required reserves. Com-
pensating balance requirements based upon the average
balances of borrowers can be profitable for banks and
their customers since the firms may use their demand de-
posits as compensating balances or as working balances,
and banks retain the demand deposit liabilities they create
from the excess reserve they lend to their customers.
Through use of such compensating balance agreements
banks and their customers are able to circumvent the




allows the customer to satisfy the com-
balance requirement with its average
and
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